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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model of a small open economy to
assess the eﬀects of agency costs and asymmetric information in credit
markets. The framework of the analysis is a dynamic general equilibrium
model with microeconomic foundations, where agents’ decisions are de-
rived from optimising behaviour and prices are sticky. Agency costs arise
from an ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders
and raise the cost of external ﬁnancing. To assess the long-run eﬀects of
agency costs and their impact on business cycle ﬂuctuations the model,
which is calibrated for New Zealand, is solved with and without agency
costs. A decline in the degree of information asymmetry and hence agency
costs increases the steady state level of capital, investment and output.
Agency costs also have important eﬀects on the business cycle and the
adjustment paths of interest and exchange rates.
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11 Introduction and motivation
This paper develops a computable general equilibrium model of a small open
economy in which asymmetric information in credit markets can aﬀect business
cycle ﬂuctuations. Modern macroeconomic models used by policy makers gen-
erally do not account explicitly for asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders or credit market frictions more generally.1 The assumption in these
models is that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds. Under the as-
sumption that ﬁnancial markets are complete and information and transaction
costs are non-existent, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem states that the
mix of debt and equity used to ﬁnance ﬁrms’ expenditures does not aﬀect the ex-
pected proﬁtability of a project — the same investment decisions would be made,
irrespective of the mix of debt and equity ﬁnance.
The assumption of zero information and transaction costs (or perfect informa-
tion) has come under increasing criticism since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper. It
illustrates how imperfect information between buyers and sellers can cause market
malfunctioning and how eﬃcient markets need some mechanism for overcoming
the imperfect information problem.
T h ec r e d i tc h a n n e ll i t e r a t u r ee x a m i n e st h ei m p a c to fa s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o n
and other credit market frictions on real spending and economic activity and the
implications for monetary policy.2 Asymmetric information between borrowers
(investors) and lenders (savers) is thought to aﬀect the transmission of shocks to
the economy in two ways. First, a shock to the economy can inﬂuence ﬁnancial
intermediaries’ willingness to provide loans. This channel is referred to as the
bank lending channel. The second channel is the balance sheet channel. It
focuses on the impact of shocks on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial positions and their ability
to borrow. The focus in this paper is on the balance sheet channel. The bank
lending channel is assessed in Claus (2004). Using a computable dynamic general
equilibrium model Claus (2004) ﬁnds that the eﬀects of bank lending are likely
to be small.
The balance sheet channel is caused by the presence of agency costs. Agency
costs arise in a principal-agent relation when agents have an incentive not to
perform in the best interest of the principal. In credit markets, agency costs
occur whenever lenders delegate control over resources to borrowers, leading to
adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring costs because of the inability of
1See, for example, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s Forecasting and Policy System (Black,
Cassino, Drew, Hansen, Hunt, Rose and Scott 1997), the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’
FRB/US model (Brayton and Tinsley 1996), the International Monetary Fund’s MULTIMOD
model for industrial countries (Laxton, Isard, Faruqee, Prasad and Turtelboom 1998), the
Bank of Canada’s Quarterly Projection Model (Black, Laxton, Rose and Tetlow 1994) or the
Australian Treasury’s TRYM model (Commonwealth Treasury 1996a, 1996b). Credit market
eﬀects are not completely ignored by these models, but tend to be incorporated in an ad hoc
manner as borrowing or cash ﬂow constraints.
2See Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Mishkin (1995) and Walsh (1998) among others.
2lenders to monitor borrowers or share in borrowers’ information costlessly.
In this model, agency costs arise because of an ex post information asymme-
try, i.e. only borrowers can costlessly observe actual returns after project com-
pletion. The imperfect information leads to a moral hazard problem and lowers
the probability that a loan will be repaid. Financial intermediaries help overcome
the information asymmetry by lending to entrepreneurs via a debt contract and
monitoring entrepreneurs who default on their loans.
The credit channel literature has tended to use calibrated general equilibrium
models. This is because assessing the quantitative eﬀects empirically is diﬃcult
due to limited data, for example, on balance sheets or lending criteria. Impor-
tant advances have been made, such as incorporating heterogeneous agents and
asymmetric information into a representative agent framework. However, much
of the literature to date has focused on the United States, a large semi-closed
economy.3 The credit channel has not yet been incorporated in a model of an
open economy with a ﬂoating exchange rate.4 This paper is a step toward ﬁlling
this gap. It also contributes to the new open economy macroeconomics literature
t h a tb e g a nt oe m e r g ew i t hO b s t f e l da n dR o g o ﬀ’s (1995) Redux model.5 This lit-
erature focuses on developing open economy dynamic general equilibrium models
that incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model,
which is calibrated for New Zealand. Section 3 discusses the steady state model
with and without agency costs. Next, the eﬀects of agency costs on business
cycle ﬂuctuations are evaluated. The dynamic model is solved in section 4 and
the dynamic properties with and without agency costs are assessed in section 5.
The last section summarises and concludes.
2 The general equilibrium model
The theoretical model builds on Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1997) closed economy
agency cost model. It is extended to include a foreign sector, a ﬂoating exchange
rate, sticky prices, an inﬂation targeting monetary authority and a government.
The foreign sector is incorporated following McCallum and Nelson (1999). Firms
use commodity inputs, which they import at the beginning of each period, to
produce consumption goods. They sell the output to domestic and foreign con-
sumers. Exports are a function of the real exchange rate and foreign demand.
The domestic economy operates under a ﬂexible exchange rate and uncovered
interest rate parity holds. Domestic prices are assumed to adjust only sluggishly.
3See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), Fuerst (1995), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
and Fisher (1999) among others.
4Edwards and Végh (1997) develop a theoretical model of a small open economy with a
predetermined exchange rate. In their model, the policy maker sets the exchange rate and
stands ready to exchange domestic money for international reserves (or vice versa) at the
prevailing exchange rate.
5For a review of the new open economy macroeconomics literature see Lane (2001).
32.1 Overview of the model
There are six agents in the economy: households, entrepreneurs, ﬁrms, ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries, a government and a monetary authority. Households and
entrepreneurs form a continuum of agents with unit mass. The proportion of
households is given by 1 − η and of entrepreneurs by η.
Financial intermediaries are modelled as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The
set-up for households and entrepreneurs is slightly modiﬁed in that households
and entrepreneurs purchase an index of consumption goods rather than a single
good. The speciﬁcation for ﬁrms also diﬀers to allow for nominal rigidities and a
foreign sector. Moreover, a monetary authority and a government are included,
which Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) do not incorporate.
Households provide labour and capital to ﬁrms and consume. They face a
deposit-in-advance constraint and must hold demand deposits to purchase con-
sumption goods. Households also hold bonds in the form of domestic and foreign
securities.
Firms are monopolistic competitors and produce consumption goods by hiring
labour and renting capital from households and entrepreneurs. They also use
imported commodity inputs. Firms sell their output to domestic households,
entrepreneurs, the government and foreign consumers, who purchase quantities
of an index of goods.
Entrepreneurs produce the capital good that ﬁrms use in the production of
consumption goods. The capital good may be thought as a durable asset like trees
and consumption goods can be thought of as a non-durable commodity like fruit.
To produce the capital good entrepreneurs use external ﬁnancing and their own
net worth consisting of wage earnings and their own capital. Entrepreneurs ob-
tain external ﬁnancing from households through ﬁnancial intermediaries (capital
mutual funds). For each unit of capital good that households wish to obtain they
give ˆ Ψt units of their consumption good index to ﬁnancial intermediaries.6 ˆ Ψt
thus denotes the real price of capital in consumption goods. Households provide
external ﬁnance to entrepreneurs via ﬁnancial intermediaries because the produc-
tion of capital is subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. This leads to agency
costs because the technology shocks are freely observable only by entrepreneurs.
Financial intermediaries help overcome the information asymmetry problem by
lending to entrepreneurs via a debt contract and monitoring entrepreneurs who
default on their debt.
The government collects taxes from households and entrepreneurs to purchase
consumption goods from ﬁrms. The monetary authority has an explicit consumer
6A change in variables is introduced as inﬂation is positive in steady state (discussed further
below) and nominal variables are trending. Let
Ψt+i
Pt+i = ˆ Ψt+i,
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t
















t−1+i = ˆ Bh∗
t+i for i =0 , 1. Capital letters with a “ ˆ ”t h u sd e n o t e
real values of nominal variables. The variables are deﬁned further in the text.
4Table 1: Chronology of events in the agency cost model
Firms import commodity inputs, hire labour and rent capital from
households and entrepreneurs to produce consumption goods.
The government and foreign consumers purchase consumption goods.
Households decide how much of their income to hold in ﬁnancial assets.
They purchase an index of consumption goods and decide how much to
consume immediately and how much to use to obtain the capital good.
For each unit of capital that households wish to acquire, they give ˆ Ψt
units of the consumption good index to ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Financial intermediaries use households’ funds to provide loans to en-
trepreneurs via a debt contract to produce the capital good.
Entrepreneurs borrow from ﬁnancial intermediaries and place all
funds, both loans and their own net worth, into their capital-creating
technology.
The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur is realised.
Entrepreneurs either produce the capital good and repay their loan
in capital goods or declare bankruptcy. In the case of bankruptcy
ﬁnancial intermediaries monitor entrepreneurs and absorb any losses.
Entrepreneurs, who are still solvent, make their consumption decision.
Financial intermediaries deliver households’ capital goods.
price inﬂation target and acts to achieve this target by adjusting the rate of
interest paid on domestic bonds.
Table 1 summarises the chronology of events.
2.2 Financial intermediaries
The primary role of ﬁnancial intermediaries is to channel funds from households
to entrepreneurs.7 Households have savings, but no productive uses for them,
while entrepreneurs have productive investments, but insuﬃcient funds to carry
them out. Financial intermediaries reduce the costs of moving funds between
borrowers (investors) and lenders (savers) because they can enhance risk diver-
siﬁcation and help overcome an information asymmetry problem, leading to a
more eﬃcient allocation of resources. By taking advantage of economies of scale
7Financial intermediaries also hold households’ demand deposits and issue domestic bonds.
5ﬁnancial intermediaries can promise households a higher payoﬀ relative to the
non-intermediated case. To resolve the imperfect information problem between
borrowers and lenders ﬁnancial intermediaries lend to entrepreneurs via a debt
contract, an agreement by the borrower to pay the lender a ﬁxed amount. Debt
contracts are negotiated at the beginning of each period and resolved by the end
of the period.
The information asymmetry arises because entrepreneurs must use external
ﬁnancing to produce the capital good and because their production technology
is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. The set-up for ﬁnancial intermediaries follows
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Each entrepreneur i borrows (INt (i) − NWt (i))
consumption goods, where INt (i) is the size of entrepreneur i’s investment project
and NWt (i) is entrepreneur i’s net worth or internal funds. After capital is
produced loans are repaid in capital goods. Each entrepreneur i has access to
a stochastic technology, ωt (i), that transforms an input of INt consumption
goods into ωt (i)INt units of new capital. The random variable ωt (i) is assumed
to be lognormally distributed across time and entrepreneurs, i.e. ln(ωt (i)) ∼
N
¡
˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢
, with a mean of unity and a standard deviation of σ. The distribution
function and density of ωt (i) are given by Φ(ωt (i)) and φ(ωt (i)).
Agency costs arise because ωt (i) can only be observed costlessly by the entre-
preneur. Others (lenders) can only observe ωt (i) at a monitoring cost of αINt (i)
capital inputs, i.e. there is costly state veriﬁcation (Townsend 1979). The infor-
mation asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem because entrepreneurs have
an incentive to underreport their true value of ωt (i). The optimal debt contract
is structured so that entrepreneurs always truthfully report the value of ωt (i).
The optimal contract is risky debt and is characterised by the size of entre-
preneur i’s project, INt (i), and a critical ωt (i) that triggers bankruptcy, denoted
by  t (i). If the realisation of the technology shock ωt (i) is below the critical
 t (i), the entrepreneur becomes bankrupt and defaults on the debt contract. In
the event of default, the ﬁnancial intermediary monitors the entrepreneur, as in
Williamson (1986), occurs the monitoring cost, conﬁscates all returns from the
project and absorbs any losses.
To derive the optimal project size INt (i) and the critical  t (i) that triggers
bankruptcy it is convenient to deﬁne the functions f ( ) and g( ).T h e ya r et h e
fractions of the expected net capital output received by the entrepreneur and by
the lender. Time and entrepreneur subscripts have been dropped for simplicity.














ωdΦ(ω) − αΦ( )+[ 1− Φ( )]  (2)
Note that f ( ) integrates only over values of ω in excess of   and g( ) integrates
over 0 to  . Moreover, the two functions do not sum to one because of expected
bankruptcy and monitoring costs, i.e.
f ( )+g( )=1− αΦ( ) (3)
The expected net capital output received by the entrepreneur and lender from
entrepreneur i’s project is given by f ( t (i)) ˆ ΨtINt (i) and g( t (i)) ˆ ΨtINt (i),
where ˆ Ψt denotes the aggregate price of capital in terms of consumption goods.
The optimal contract between the lender and entrepreneur is given by the pair
(INt (i),  t (i)) that maximises the entrepreneur’s net capital output subject to




f ( t (i)) ˆ ΨtINt (i) (4)
subject to8
g( t (i)) ˆ ΨtINt (i) ≥ INt (i) − NWt (i) (5)








1−g( t(i))ˆ Ψt (7)
Using (3) equation (6) can be written as
ˆ Ψt
³





Equation (8) deﬁnes the critical  t (i) as a function of the aggregate price of
capital, ˆ Ψt, the distribution of the stochastic technology shock, ωt (i),a n dt h e
monitoring cost, α. The critical  t (i) is independent of i; that is, all entrepreneurs
receive the same basic terms on their debt contract. Contracts only diﬀer in terms
of size — entrepreneurs with larger net worth receive a proportionately larger loan
(equation 7). This result is important as it overcomes the heterogeneity problem
with entrepreneurs that arises from the idiosyncratic technology shock. The result
follows from the assumption of linear monitoring costs and investment technology.
Variables speciﬁct oi can henceforth be interpreted as averages.





1−g( t)ˆ Ψt (9)
where
f( t)ˆ ΨtINt
NWt denotes the expected net capital output received by entrepre-
neurs per unit of leveraged net worth.
8At an optimum, equation (5) holds as an equality.
72.3 Firms
Firms are monopolistic competitors and specialise in production. They produce
aggregate output of consumption goods, Yt, under a constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) technology by hiring household and entrepreneurial labour, Lh
t and
Le
t, using capital, Kt, and commodity inputs, IMt. Commodity inputs, IMt,a r e
imported at the beginning of each period. Returning to the earlier analogy, ﬁrms
can be thought of as producing consumption goods, fruit, using trees, labour
and commodity imports as production inputs, where commodity imports may be
fertilisers.
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where ηl,η k,η im ∈ (0,1] are parameters and ν<1; that is, the marginal return
to each input is diminishing. Zt denotes aggregate productivity and the elasticity
of substitution in production is given by 1
1−ν.9
The assumption of monopolistic competition in the consumption goods market
allows pricing decisions to be determined explicitly and provides a channel for
introducing nominal rigidities. A ﬁrm treats the price in domestic currency, Pt (j),
of the consumption good j it produces as a choice variable, while taking the
domestic aggregate price level, Pt, the nominal exchange rate, St,a n dt h ef o r e i g n
price level, P∗
t ,a sg i v e n . 10 Having chosen Pt (j),t h eﬁrm then produces the
quantity of output demanded at that price. Firms may not price discriminate and




Firms sell their output of consumption goods, Yt, to domestic households and
entrepreneurs and the government. They also export to the rest of the world.
Let Ch
t (j), Ce
t (j), EXt (j) and Gt (j) be the quantity of consumption good j
demanded by a typical household, entrepreneur and foreign consumer, and the
government, i.e. Yt (j)=Ch
t (j)+Ce
t (j)+EXt (j)+Gt (j). It can be shown (e.g.
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996) that the household’s, entrepreneur’s and government’s

















9The production function is similar to that in the New Zealand Treasury macroeconomic
model. See Szeto (2002) for details.
10The nominal exchange rate, St, is measured as the price of foreign currency in units of










t and Gt denote total consumption by the typical household and







,w h e r eθ is the price elasticity of demand faced by
each monopolistic competitive ﬁrm. Similarly, foreign demand for consumption







where EXt denotes aggregate exports.11 Aggregate export demand is a function
of the real exchange rate, Qt ≡
StP∗
t
Pt , and foreign demand for the domestic coun-
try’s output, Y ∗











where κ, ς > 0 are the price and foreign demand elasticities of exports.
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equilibrium, all ﬁrms charge the same relative price, employ the same labour and
use the same capital and commodity inputs. This leads to the following ﬁrst-order







































t and ˆ We
t denote households’ and entrepreneurs’ real wage rate, Rt is




t + ˆ We
t Le
t + RtKt + QtIMt
´
.T h e
ﬁrst-order conditions show that ﬁrms sell their output of consumption goods at
am a r k - u p ,ξt, over production costs and factor prices are below their marginal
products. The mark-up, ξt, is the ratio of the price level to aggregate marginal
cost. Under price ﬂexibility, it is constant and equal to θ
θ−1.
11The exchange rate cancels out in the relative price term.
12The domestic economy’s exports are assumed to form an insigniﬁcant proportion of for-
eigners’ demand and have a negligible weight in the rest of the world’s price index.
13The real exchange rate, Qt, is given in period t.
92.4 Households
Households are inﬁnitely lived. A typical household values streams of consump-











+ γ (1 − Nt+j)
ª
(20)
where γ>0 is a parameter, β ∈ (0,1) denotes the household’s discount factor
and Ch
t is an index of household consumption in period t. Time is normalised to
one — the household’s labour supply is given by Nt and (1 − Nt) is leisure. Et
is the conditional expectations operator with respect to information available at
time t.
Each household consumes many goods, all of which are domestically produced.
Ch











,w h e r eCh
t (j) denotes the household’s period t consumption
of good j and θ>0 (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977).
Households hold ﬁnancial assets consisting of demand deposits with ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries, domestic bonds issued by ﬁnancial intermediaries and foreign
bonds.14 The typical household’s ﬁnancial wealth in real terms, ˆ Ah
t,i sg i v e nb y
ˆ Ah
t = ˆ Dt + ˆ Bh
t + Qt ˆ Bh∗
t (21)
where ˆ Dt, ˆ Bh
t and ˆ Bh∗
t denote the real stock of demand deposits and domestic
and foreign bonds and Qt is the real exchange rate. In addition, households own
capital, Kh
t , that they rent to ﬁrms.
Households derive income from three sources. First, the typical household
earns wage income, ˆ Wh
t Nt, from supplying labour, Nt,t oﬁrms, where ˆ Wh
t de-
notes households’ real wage rate. Second, households receive interest from holding
ﬁnancial assets. Domestic bonds, ˆ Bh
t , earn a nominal return (in terms of domestic
currency) of It and the rate of interest paid on foreign bonds, ˆ Bh∗
t ,i sg i v e nb yI∗
t .
Demand deposits, ˆ Dt, do not earn any interest — they are held to purchase con-
sumption goods. Third, households earn income from renting their accumulated
capital holdings, Kh
t ,a tr a t eRt to ﬁrms. Households pay taxes on their wage
and rental income. For simplicity, it is assumed that households’ interest income
and capital gains from exchange rate and capital price movements are not taxed.
T h et a xr a t ei m p o s e db yt h eg o v e r n m e n ti sg i v e nb yτ.
The typical household’s ﬂow constraint in real terms is given by











t − It ˆ Dt
1+Πt − ˆ Ah
t+1 − ˆ ΨtKh
t+1 =0
(22)
14In the analysis domestic bond holdings are assumed to be zero and demand deposits earn
no interest. These assumptions are made for simplicity and allow to abstract from ﬁnancial
intermediaries’ budget constraint.
10where It ˆ Dt
1+Πt denotes the opportunity cost of having to hold demand deposits and
δ is the depreciation rate of capital.15 The ﬂow constraint can be interpreted as
follows. Each period, households receive income from supplying labour. They
also earn a real return on their ﬁnancial assets and accumulated capital holdings.
Households then sell all their ﬁnancial assets and capital net of depreciation
to purchase consumption goods, new ﬁnancial assets and capital. The price of
capital in terms of consumption goods is given by ˆ Ψt. The budget constraint is
binding and households’ expenditure is equal to their income.
The typical household’s deposit-in-advance constraint in real terms is given
by
Ch
t ≤ ˆ Dt (23)
and will hold as an equality, at an optimum, if It > 0. The deposit-in-advance
constraint provides a channel for incorporating monetary policy into the model
similar to that in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000). The typical household’s lifetime






















Ct+j − ˆ Ψt+jKh
t+1+j} =0
(24)
The household’s optimisation problem consists of choosing
©
Ch
t ,N t,K h
t+1
ª
for all t ∈ [0,∞) to maximise lifetime utility (equation 20) subject to equation
































Equation (25) indicates that, at an optimum, the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure is equal to the relative price of consumption;
that is, the ratio of the eﬀective price of consumption and the after-tax real wage
rate. The eﬀective price of consumption is the sum of its market price (equal to






. Equation (26) implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption today and next period is equal to a unit value
of the capital stock net of depreciation plus the after-tax rate of return on capital.
15Uncovered interest rate parity is assumed to hold.
112.5 Entrepreneurs
The speciﬁcation for entrepreneurs follows Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) except for
two diﬀerences. First, ﬁrms and entrepreneurs are modelled separately because of
the assumption of monopolistic competition in the consumption goods market. In
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) there are no nominal rigidities. Firms are perfectly
competitive and owned by entrepreneurs. Second, entrepreneurs consume an
index of consumption goods rather than a single good.
Entrepreneurs are inﬁnitely lived and produce the capital (investment) good,
which ﬁrms use as an input in the production of consumption goods. Or using
the earlier analogy, entrepreneurs grow trees, which are a production input to
produce fruit. The production of the capital good uses consumption goods; that
is, entrepreneurs grow trees from fruit.
Each entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology, ωt, that transforms
an input of INt consumption goods (fruit) into ωtINt units of new capital (trees).
To ﬁnance the production of the capital good (trees), entrepreneurs use external
ﬁnancing and their own net worth. External ﬁnancing is obtained from ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries and is the proportion of the consumption goods (fruit) that
households handed over to ﬁnancial intermediaries to obtain capital goods (trees),
which they rent to ﬁrms to produce consumption goods (fruit). Entrepreneurs’
net worth consists of their after-tax wage earnings and the market value of their
capital stock (trees). A typical entrepreneur’s net worth, NWt,i nr e a lt e r m si s
given by
NWt =( 1− τ) ˆ We
t +
³





t is the real wage rate for entrepreneurial labour, with entrepreneurial
labour supply equal to unity, and Ke
t is the entrepreneur’s capital stock (trees).16
The assumption of entrepreneurial labour income ensures that entrepreneurs al-
ways have a nonzero level of net worth.
After production of the capital good commences the idiosyncratic technology
shock, ωt, is realised. Entrepreneurs who are still solvent after the shock occurs
repay their loans and make their consumption decision. The typical entrepre-








t is an index of entrepreneurial consumption (of fruit) in period t and
ζ ∈ (0,1) is an additional discount factor.17 Entrepreneurs are assumed to dis-
count the future more heavily than households to ensure that they use external
16The production of capital goods (trees) uses consumption goods (fruit) and entrepreneurs
must ﬁrst sell their accumulated capital stock (trees) to ﬁnancial intermediaries for consumption
goods (fruit).
17As households, each (solvent) entrepreneur consumes many goods and Ce
t is the quantity
12ﬁnancing. Agency costs imply that the return to internal funds is greater than
the return to external funds and entrepreneurs have an incentive to postpone all
consumption and accumulate internal funds to self-ﬁnance.18
The typical entrepreneur’s budget constraint, after loan repayment in the form
of newly created capital (trees), is given by
³
(1 − τ) ˆ We
t +
³








t − ˆ ΨtKe
t+1 =0
(29)
Note that, as in the case of households, entrepreneurs’ wage earnings and re-
turn to capital are taxed but capital gains from capital price movements are not.
Equation (29) states that the entrepreneur’s net worth, (1 − τ) ˆ We
t +((1 − δ) ˆ Ψt+
(1 − τ)Rt)Ke
t, earns an expected return to internal funds of
f( t)ˆ Ψt
1−g( t)ˆ Ψt. The entre-
preneur then sells a proportion of this newly created capital (trees) to ﬁnancial
intermediaries to purchase consumption goods (fruit), Ce
t,a n dKe
t+1 denotes the
entrepreneurial capital (trees) left after consumption.







all t ∈ [0,∞) to maximise lifetime utility (equation 28) subject to equation (29).
The entrepreneur’s ﬁrst-order condition is given by
ˆ Ψt = Et
∙






1−g( t+1)ˆ Ψt+1 in equation (30) is the gross expected return on internal
funds and is greater than one. It is this additional return that encourages en-
trepreneurs to accumulate capital (trees) even though they discount the future
more than households. To avoid self-ﬁnancing, in the calibration ζ is set to oﬀset
the steady state internal return, i.e.
ζf(¯  )¯ Ψ
1−g(¯  )¯ Ψ =1 .19
2.6 Government









− Gt =0 (31)









. It uses this revenue to purchase an index of










,w h e r eCe
t (j)
denotes the typical (solvent) entrepreneur’s period t consumption of good j.
18With no external ﬁnancing, agency costs disappear. The additional discount factor avoids
this outcome.
19Letters with a “ − ” indicate (average) steady state levels.
13consumption goods, Gt,f r o mﬁrms.20 For simplicity, the government’s budget
constraint is assumed to balance in each period, i.e. there is no debt ﬁnancing.
2.7 Monetary authority
The monetary authority has an explicit consumer price inﬂation target, ΠT.T o
maintain this target following a shock to the economy the central bank adjusts
the nominal rate of interest paid on domestic bonds, It+1. Its reaction function
is based on a variant of the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993) and depends on deviations
of inﬂation from target and deviations of output from full capacity ﬂexible price
output as in a Taylor rule, and the previous interest rate, It. Full capacity ﬂexible
price output and the central bank’s reaction function are discussed further in
section 4.
2.8 Market clearing and equilibrium conditions
There are four domestic markets in the economy: two labour markets, a con-
sumption goods market and a capital goods market. The clearing conditions are
given by
Lh
t =( 1− η)Nt (32)
Le
t = η (33)
Yt =( 1− η)Ch
t + ηCe
t + Gt + EXt + ηINt (34)
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + ηINt (1 − αΦ( t)) (35)














t } are given to the small open economy. For simplicity, it is
assumed that all households’ bond holdings are in the form of foreign securities,
i.e. ˆ Bh
t =0for all t.
3 The steady state model
This section derives the steady state model with and without agency costs. Pa-
rameter values are chosen so that the steady state of the agency cost model is
broadly consistent with New Zealand data and/or assumptions made in the lit-
erature. A period in the model is assumed to correspond to one quarter and the
following parameters are chosen.









,w h e r eGt (j) denotes the government’s period t consumption of
good j.
14Households’ discount rate, β,e q u a l s0.9902 and leads to an annual steady
state, pre-tax real domestic interest rate of 4 percent. The coeﬃcient on leisure,
γ, in households’ utility function is chosen so that work eﬀort accounts for a third
of the time endowment in steady state. The ratio of entrepreneurs to households,
η, is arbitrarily set to 0.1.
Labour-augmenting productivity, ¯ Z,i sn o r m a l i s e dt o1 in steady state. The
elasticity of substitution between labour, capital and commodity inputs, 1
1−ν,
is set to 1
1.1 to approximate the consumption production technology assumed
in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), which is Cobb-Douglas. The coeﬃcients on
household labour, ηl, capital, ηk, and commodity inputs, ηim,i nﬁrms’ production
function are 0.5631, 0.3168 and 0.12 respectively. These assumptions are broadly
in line with the New Zealand input-output data for 1995-96 and yield a steady
state ratio of imports to output of about 0.12, the same as in McCallum and
Nelson (1999). The capital depreciation rate is set to 8.5 percent per annum, the
same as in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’ macroeconomic model.21 Firms’
m a r k - u pi ns t e a d ys t a t ei s20 percent ( θ
θ−1 =1 .2), i.e. θ =6 ,t h es a m ea si n
McCallum and Nelson (1999).
The assumptions for entrepreneurs’ discount factor and for ﬁnancial interme-
d i a r i e sa r et h es a m ea si nC a r l s t r o ma n dF u e r s t( 1 9 9 7 ) . E n t r e p r e n e u r s ’e x t r a
discount factor, ζ,i s0.947. The monitoring cost, α,i ss e tt o0.25. The bank-
ruptcy rate, Φ(¯  ),i s0.974 percent per quarter and the standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic technology shocks, σ,i s0.207.22
The annual domestic steady state inﬂation rate is equal to the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand’s inﬂation target rate, ΠT,o f2 percent, which is the mid-point
of the 1 to 3 p e r c e n tt a r g e tb a n df o ri n ﬂation. The tax rate, τ,e q u a l s17 percent
in line with the income tax assumption in the Reserve Bank’s model.
For simplicity, the steady state foreign inﬂation rate, ¯ Π∗, and nominal bond
rate, ¯ I∗, are assumed to be the same as for the domestic economy and the steady
state real exchange rate, ¯ Q,i sn o r m a l i s e dt o1. The price and foreign demand
elasticities of exports, κ and ς,a r ee q u a lt ou n i t y ,a si nM c C a l l u ma n dN e l s o n
(2001) and foreign demand is chosen to yield a steady state ratio of exports to
output of 0.11, the same as in McCallum and Nelson (1999).





Φ(¯  )=0 .00974 (38)
¯ Ψ = 1
1−αΦ(¯  )+
αφ(¯  )f(¯  )
f0(¯  ) (39)
21See Black et al. (1997) for details.
22The standard deviation and entrepreneurs’ discount factor imply an annual risk premium
of 187 basis points. The steady state quarterly risk premium is given by
¯ Ψ ¯   ¯ IN
¯ IN− ¯ NW − 1.
15¯ IR=
f(¯  )¯ Ψ
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¯ Y ν = ηl
¡ ¯ Z¯ Lh¢ν + ηk ¯ Kν + ηim ¯ IM
ν +( 1− ηl − ηk − ηim) (44)





























¯ IN = δ ¯ K
1−αΦ(¯  ) (46)
¯ NW = ¯ IN
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− ¯ Ψ ¯ Ke (49)
¯ EX =0 .11 · ¯ Y (50)
¯ G = τ
µ











η + ¯ Ce (53)
The steady state values for [Kt+1,K e
t+1,N W t,I N t,C h
t ,C e
t,C t,G t,E X t,Y t,
Lh
t,I M t, ˆ Ψt,R t,I R t] are summarised in Table 2. Column (1) reports the results
for the agency cost model.
The steady state ratios of aggregate (household and entrepreneurial) consump-
tion, government consumption, investment and exports to output are 0.6477,
0.1207, 0.1216 and 0.11 respectively. The ratio of imports to steady state output
is 0.1233. These ratios are lower than in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s
16Table 2: Numerical steady state of the agency cost model
agency cost no agency diﬀerence
model costs
(1) (2) (3)
¯ K capital 23.9179 24.6722 3.1536
¯ Ke entrepreneurial capital 0.1820 0.0000 −100.0000
¯ NW entrepreneurial net worth 0.1885 0.0000 −100.0000
¯ IN investment 0.4940 0.5084 2.9024
¯ Ch household consumption 0.2911 0.2943 1.0954
¯ Ce entrepreneurial consumption 0.0127 0.0000 −100.0000
¯ C aggregate consumption 2.6323 2.6483 0.6080
¯ G government consumption 0.4905 0.4953 0.9706
¯ EX exports 0.4470 0.4514 0.9706
¯ Y output 4.0638 4.1033 0.9706
¯ Lh household labour 2.7000 2.7000 0.0000
¯ IM imports 0.5010 0.5059 0.9706
¯ Ψ price of capital 1.0238 1.0000 −2.3255
¯ R rental rate of capital 0.0408 0.0119 −2.8968
¯ IR return to internal funds 0.0559 n/a n/a
¯ C/¯ Y 0.6477 0.6454 −0.2326
¯ G/¯ Y 0.1207 0.1207 0.0000
¯ IN/¯ Y 0.1216 0.1239 0.2326
¯ EX/¯ Y 0.1100 0.1100 0.0000
¯ IM/¯ Y 0.1233 0.1233 0.0000
¯ NW/ ¯ IN 0.3816 n/a n/a
¯ Ce/ ¯ NW 0.0673 n/a n/a
Note: ¯ K, ¯ Ke, ¯ NW, ¯ IN, ¯ Ch, ¯ Ce, ¯ C, ¯ G, ¯ EX, ¯ Y,¯ Lh and ¯ IM denote steady
state averages. All variables are reported at quarterly rates. All diﬀer-
ences are in percent except for ¯ R, ¯ C/¯ Y , ¯ G/¯ Y , ¯ IN/¯ Y , ¯ EX/¯ Y and ¯ IM/¯ Y ,
which are in percentage points.
17macroeconomic model, in part, because in this model all imports are intermedi-
ate goods whereas in the Reserve Bank’s model a proportion of imports is for
ﬁnal demand.
The internal ﬁnancing percentage, i.e. the ratio of net worth to investment,
at 0.3816 and the ratio of entrepreneurial consumption to net worth at 0.0673 are
in line with the results in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The price of capital, the
rental rate of capital and the rate of return to internal funds are 1.0238, 0.0408
and 0.0559, the same as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
Next, the steady state model is solved without agency costs to assess the
long-run real eﬀects of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders.
Agency costs arose because entrepreneurs’ production technology is stochastic
and because they must use external ﬁnancing. Agency costs disappear when
entrepreneurs’ production process becomes certain. With no idiosyncratic tech-
nology shocks entrepreneurs no longer become bankrupt and default on their
debt. Financial intermediaries’ monitoring costs become zero and entrepreneurs
can borrow directly from households. In fact, entrepreneurs obtain all external
ﬁnancing from households and do not need to accumulate net worth. As a result,
entrepreneurs’ capital is zero. Wage earnings and consumption are also set to
zero for simplicity. Hence, the steady state model (equations 37 to 53) with no
agency costs can be solved by setting α = ¯ NW = ¯ Ce = ¯ We = ¯ Ke =0 .M o r e o v e r ,
the price of capital is the same as for consumption, i.e. ¯ Ψ =1 . The results are
reported in Table 2, column (2). Column (3) reports the diﬀerences between the
model without agency costs and the agency cost model.
Without agency costs and net worth, the price and rental rate of capital are
lower, leading to a rise in the steady state level of investment and capital. Steady
state investment is about 3 percent and capital about 3.2 percent higher than in
the agency cost model. Output rises by about 1 percent. The increase in output
raises households’ wages — households’ labour is assumed constant. Households’
rental income also increases despite the fall in the return to capital because of
a larger capital stock. The increase in households’ income raises aggregate con-
sumption. Government consumption is also higher due to an increase in tax
revenue. Commodity imports, which are an input into production, increase with
the rise in output and steady state exports, which are a ﬁxed proportion of out-
put, are also higher.
The steady state comparisons of the model with and without agency costs lead
to the following conclusions. Agency costs arise from an information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders and increase the cost of external ﬁnancing. A
reduction in agency costs lowers the price and rental rate of capital, leading to
a rise in the long-run level of steady state capital, investment, consumption and
output.
184 The dynamic model
Next, the impact of agency costs on business cycle ﬂuctuations is assessed. To
evaluate the eﬀects, the economy is subjected to aggregate shocks and the adjust-
ment paths of the agency cost model back to steady state are compared to those
of the model without agency costs. The dynamic responses of the two models are
derived in terms of logarithmic deviations from steady state (denoted by lower
case letters).
Following an aggregate shock ﬁrms adjust prices and the monetary authority
a d j u s t si n t e r e s tr a t e sa si n ﬂation deviates from target and the economy operates
above or below full capacity output. The price adjustment follows Calvo (1983)
and is assumed to be sluggish. Each period there is a constant probability, ϕ,
that ﬁrms can adjust their prices. This leads to the following price adjustment
equation
Et [πt+1]=βEt [πt+2]+ (yt − ¯ yt) (54)
where   =
ϕ(1−(1−ϕ)β)
(1−ϕ)θ and ¯ yt is the log level of aggregate ﬂexible price output
of consumption goods. πt is given in period t and Et [πt+1] is the inﬂation rate
following an unanticipated shock to the economy. Equation (54) thus states that
inﬂation is a function of expected future inﬂation and the output gap, deﬁned as
deviations of output from full capacity, yt − ¯ yt. In the dynamic analysis below
the probability that ﬁrms can adjust prices is set to 0.33, i.e. prices remain
unchanged on average for three quarters.
Full capacity, ﬂexible price output is derived next.23 It is the total domestic
output of consumption goods that would be produced under price ﬂexibility, i.e.
in the absence of any restrictions of adjusting prices. Under price ﬂexibility,
aggregate output of consumption goods, ¯ Yt,i sg i v e nb y













t, ¯ Kt and ¯ IMt denote the ﬂexible price level of household labour, capital
and commodity imports and ¯ Le
t = η for all t. Log-linearising equation (55) yields
























The log level of ﬂexible price household labour, ¯ lh
t , can be derived from house-
holds’ ﬁrst-order condition that the marginal utility of leisure is equal to the
after-tax real wage rate and ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order condition determining labour de-
mand (equation 16). It is given by
¯ lh
t =¯ yt + ν
1−νzt (57)
23The derivation partly follows McCallum and Nelson (1999).
19where the mark-up ξt is constant and equal to θ
θ−1.T h el o gl e v e l so fﬂexible price
capital, ¯ kt,a n dc o m m o d i t yi m p o r t s , ¯ imt, can be derived from ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order
conditions (18) and (19) with ξt equal to the constant mark-up θ
θ−1.T h e y a r e
given by
¯ kt =¯ yt − 1
1−νrt (58)
and
¯ imt =¯ yt − 1
1−νqt (59)
Substituting (57), (58) and (59) into (56) yields the ﬂexible price log output of
consumption goods

















¯ Z ¯ Lh
¯ Y
 νqt =0 (60)
Equation (60) states that the ﬂexible price level of log output is a function of
labour-augmenting productivity, the rental rate of capital and the real exchange
rate.
Following a shock to the economy the monetary authority adjusts nominal
interest rates according to the following reaction function
it+1 − µ1πt − µ2 (yt − ¯ yt) − µ3it +  i,t =0 (61)
where  i,t ∼ i.i.d. N (0;σ2
i) is an exogenous shock that can be interpreted as a
policy error. The coeﬃcients on inﬂation, the output gap and past interest rate
are given by µ1 =1 .5, µ2 =0 .5 and µ3 =0 .8.T h ec h o i c ef o rµ1 and µ2 is based
on the parameter values in a Taylor rule (Taylor 1993).24 The coeﬃcient on the
lagged interest rate is the same as in McCallum and Nelson (1999) and in line
with estimates for New Zealand by Huang, Margaritis and Mayes (2001), who
ﬁnd strong evidence of interest rate smoothing.
The rest of the dynamic model is described by the following equations:
(1 − ν)yt − (1 − ν)lh
t − ch
t + νzt + 1
θ (yt − ¯ yt) − it + πt =0 (62)
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t + ¯ Cece











αφ(¯  )¯  $t =0 (66)
24The original Taylor rule does not include the lagged interest rate.
20irt + nwt − ψt −
f0(¯  )¯  
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irt − ¯ Cece
t − ¯ Ψ ¯ Keψt − ¯ Ψ ¯ Keke
t+1 =0 (69)
1
1−g(¯  )¯ Ψψt +
³
g0(¯  )¯ Ψ


























imt − yt =0 (71)









(yt − ¯ yt)
−




imt − ¯ Ggt =0
(72)
ext − κqt − ςy∗
t =0 (73)
qt − (1 − ν)yt − 1
θ (yt − ¯ yt)+( 1− ν)imt =0 (74)
ch





− it+1 + Et [πt+1]=0 (75)






− Et [st+2]+Et [st+1]=0 (77)






The system of log-linearised equations (54, 60, 61 and 62 to 78) can be solved
with the method of undetermined coeﬃcients, using Uhlig’s (1997) procedures
for MATLAB. Using Uhlig’s (1997) notation, the dynamic stochastic model can
be described as follows. The vector of endogenous state variables is given by xt+1
containing capital, kt+1, entrepreneurial capital, ke
t+1, the domestic bond rate,
it+1,i n ﬂation, πt+1, and the nominal and real exchange rates, st+1 and qt+1.T h e
vector of endogenous variables is given by yt and contains entrepreneurial net
worth, nwt, investment, int, household and entrepreneurial consumption, ch
t and
ce
t, government consumption, gt,e x p o r t s ,ext,o u t p u t ,yt, household labour, lh
t ,
imports, imt, the price of capital, ψt, the rental rate of capital, rt,t h er a t eo f
return to internal funds, irt, the bankruptcy rate, $t,a n dﬂexible price output,
¯ yt. The vector of exogenous state variables is given by zt and discussed further
in the next section.
The following equilibrium relationships between xt+1, yt and zt are assumed
0=Axt+1 + Bxt + Cyt + Dzt (79)
0=Et [Fxt+2 + Gxt+1 + Hxt + Jyt+1 + Kyt + Lzt+1 + Mzt] (80)
zt+1 = Nzt + εt+1; Et [εt+1]=0 (81)
21where C is of size 15 × 14 and has full rank. F is of size 5 × 6 and the matrix
N is assumed to only have stable eigenvalues. The next step is to solve for the
recursive equilibrium law of motion given by
xt+1 = Pxt + Qzt (82)
yt = Rxt+1 + Szt (83)
The coeﬃcient matrices P, Q, R and S can be calculated using the method of
undermined coeﬃcients. If there exists a recursive equilibrium law of motion that
solves equations (79) to (81), then the coeﬃcient matrices, P, Q, R and S,c a n
be found as follows:
1. P satisﬁes the matrix quadratic equations
C0AP + C0B =0 (84)
(F − JC+A)P2 − (JC+B − G + KC+A)P
−KC+B + H =0 (85)
where C+ denotes the pseudo-inverse of C and C0 is a 1×15 matrix, whose
row forms a basis of the null space of C0. The equilibrium described by
the recursive equilibrium law of motion (equations 82 and 83) and equation
(81) is stable if and only if all eigenvalues of P are smaller than unity in
absolute value.
2. R is given by
R = −C+ (AP + B) (86)
3. Given P and R,l e tV
V =
∙
Ik ⊗ A, Ik ⊗ C
N0 ⊗ F + Ik ⊗ (FP + JR+ G),N0 ⊗ J + Ik ⊗ K
¸
(87)













where vec(.) denotes columnwise vectorisation. The solution for Q and S
is obtained by multiplying equation (88) with V −1 if V is invertible.
225 Impulse response analysis
The solution to the recursive equilibrium law of motion can be used to evaluate
the dynamic properties of the model with and without agency costs via impulse
response analysis. Four types of aggregate shock are considered: a shock to
domestic productivity, foreign demand, the foreign interest rate and monetary
policy. The response of the endogenous variables to an unanticipated shock in
these variables can be traced out using equations (82) and (83), under the as-
sumption that there are no other shocks. If the economy starts out in equilibrium
and there are no other shocks, x0 =0if the shock occurs in period 1,w h e r ex0
is the vector of deviations from steady state of the endogenous state variables in
period 0.
All shocks are assumed normally distributed. Productivity, zt, foreign de-
mand, y∗
t, and the foreign interest rate, i∗
t, are univariate exogenous processes
and evolve according to












t−1 +  i∗,t, where  i∗,t ∼ i.i.d. N (0;σ2
i∗) (91)
The choice of shock parameters follows McCallum and Nelson (2001), except
for the foreign demand shock. McCallum and Nelson (2001) assume that the
foreign demand shock is a random walk. Here, the shock is temporary and the
autocorrelation coeﬃcient is the same as for McCallum and Nelson’s (2001) risk
premium shock, i.e. ρy∗ =0 .5. The parameters for the foreign interest rate
shock are the same as for McCallum and Nelson’s (2001) risk premium shock.
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the productivity shock, ρz,i s0.95 and the
innovation variances are assumed to be given by σ2
z =( 0 .007)
2, σ2
y∗ =( 0 .02)
2
and σ2
i∗ =( 0 .04)
2. The standard deviation of the monetary policy shock is 0.8
percent per annum.
The impulse responses of the endogenous variables to a shock in productiv-
ity, foreign demand, the foreign interest rate and the domestic interest rate are
plotted in Figures 1 to 4 as percent deviations from steady state together with
the respective shock. The solid line shows the responses of the variables in the
agency cost model and the dotted line is the economy without agency costs. All
variables eventually return to steady state.
5.1 Productivity shock
Following a positive shock to aggregate productivity, investment, imports and
output rise instantaneously in the model without agency costs and then slowly
return to steady state as productivity starts declining (Figure 1). Household
labour also increases sharply following the labour-augmenting productivity shock
23but with a lag. In the agency cost model, the dynamics of these variables are dif-
ferent because of the behaviour of net worth. The positive shock to productivity
raises entrepreneurs’ wage and rental income. However, net worth only increases
with a lag because entrepreneurs’ capital is initially ﬁxed (see equation 69). Sub-
sequently, entrepreneurial capital rises as increased demand for capital pushes up
the price of capital and thus the return to internal funds.25 T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
return to internal funds also leads entrepreneurs to reduce their consumption,
accelerating further the accumulation of capital and net worth. The delayed in-
crease in net worth causes a hump-shaped response in investment, imports and
output. The response in household employment is also hump-shaped following
an initial decline following the labour-augmenting productivity shock.26
Another diﬀerence between the agency cost model and the model without
agency costs is in the adjustment path of the interest rate. In the agency cost
model, the central bank lowers the nominal interest rate by more than without
agency costs. This is because the output gap is more negative, putting additional
downward pressure on inﬂation. The larger negative output gap arises because
in the agency cost model full capacity, ﬂexible price output increases faster than
actual output — actual output adjusts more slowly due to the hump-shaped re-
sponse.
Finally, the adjustment paths of the exchange rate and exports diﬀer in the
model with and without agency costs. In both models, the (real) exchange rate
appreciates following the positive productivity shock, leading to an increase in
the price of exports and a decline in foreign demand. However, in the agency
cost model, the real exchange rate appreciates by less and the fall in exports is
smaller because of a larger decline in the domestic interest rate.
5.2 Foreign demand shock
The responses in the agency cost model and the model without agency costs to a
foreign demand shock are plotted in Figure 2. In both models, a positive shock
to foreign demand increases exports, leading to an increase in output. But the
eﬀects on output are magniﬁed in the agency cost model. Another diﬀerence is
that household consumption initially falls in the agency cost model because of
a decline in the price of capital and a smaller drop in investment. The decline
in household consumption in the agency cost model leads to a larger increase in
labour supply, which together with higher labour demand, raises employment by
more than in the model without agency costs.
In the agency cost model, the increase in output raises entrepreneurs’ wage
rate. However, the increase in the wage rate is insuﬃcient to oﬀset the decline in
the price of capital and a fall in the rental rate, leading to lower entrepreneurial









αφ(¯  )¯   in equation 66 is negative.
26Government consumption in both models mainly follows the response of output.
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27consumption and net worth. As the price and rental rate of capital return to
steady state, entrepreneurs’ net worth starts increasing, leading to faster capital
accumulation and consumption growth than in the model without agency costs.
In both models, the increase in foreign demand leads to excess demand, higher
inﬂation and a tightening in monetary policy. But the output gap and inﬂation
increase by more in the agency cost model than in the model without agency
costs. Consequently the interest rate increases by more and stays higher for
longer, leading to larger swings in the nominal and real exchange rates. The
(real) exchange rate appreciates by more and returns more slowly to steady state
in the agency cost model. As a result the price of imports falls by more, leading
to higher imports and eventually lower employment in the agency cost model
compared to the model without agency costs.
5.3 Foreign interest rate shock
The responses in the agency cost model and the model without agency costs to a
foreign interest rate shock are plotted in Figure 3. In both models, an unexpected
increase in the foreign interest rate leads to a nominal and real depreciation of
the domestic currency. The real depreciation lowers the cost of exports, leading
to an increase in foreign demand and exports and a small increase in domestic
output, investment, capital, employment and imports. However, in the agency
cost model, capital and investment increase less than in the model without agency
costs. This is because increased investment demand raises the price and rental
rate of capital. In both models, employment rises by more than imports because
of a substitution from imports to labour due to the real depreciation of the
exchange rate and increase in the cost of imports.
The real depreciation lowers full capacity ﬂexible price output, which together
with the increase in output leads to a positive output gap and tightening in
monetary policy. Higher domestic interest r a t e si n c r e a s et h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s to f
having to hold demand deposits and lower households’ consumption, leading to
a fall in employment, investment, imports, capital and output.
The decline in household consumption, employment, investment, imports,
capital and output is larger in the agency cost model than in the model without
agency costs. The slowing in economic activity is magniﬁed because of the eﬀects
of output on entrepreneurs’ net worth. The decline in output lowers entrepre-
neurs’ wage, leading to a fall in entrepreneurial net worth and capital accumula-
tion, accelerating further the output decline.
The sharper slow down in economic activity in the agency cost model leads
to a larger and more prolonged decline in domestic interest rates. As a result,
the (real) exchange rate depreciates by more and remains undervalued for longer
than in the model without agency costs.
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345.4 Monetary policy shock
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the two models to an unanticipated
tightening in monetary policy that increases the domestic interest rate. In both
models, the initial increase in the domestic interest rate is similar. However,
in the agency cost model, the interest rate stays higher for longer, leading to a
larger appreciation of the (real) exchange rate. The larger real appreciation in
the agency cost model raises the price of exports by more than without agency
costs, leading to a larger decline in foreign demand and exports.
In both models, output falls following the tightening in monetary policy, low-
ering the demand for household labour, imports and capital. However, capital
and investment fall slightly less in the agency cost model because of a fall in the
price of capital. Aggregate consumption falls in the agency cost model (and in-
creases slightly in the model without agency costs) as a decline in entrepreneurial
consumption more than oﬀsets an initial increase in households’ consumption.
Entrepreneurial consumption falls due to the lower price of capital, a lower rental
rate of capital and a fall in entrepreneurs’ wage. Household consumption initially
increases because the monetary policy shock only lasts for one period and the
interest rate starts returning to steady state immediately after the shock. The
decline in the interest rate lowers the opportunity cost of having to hold demand
deposits, leading to higher consumption.
The monetary policy shock reveals some interesting dynamics in the open
economy. In both models, the fall in output is quickly reversed. This is because
the real appreciation of the domestic currency lowers the cost of imports, leading
to higher imports, capital and output. Eventually the economy returns to steady
state. Household labour also increases after an initial decline, but then falls again
as output slowly returns to steady state. Employment falls faster than imports
because the real appreciation leads to a substitution from labour to imports.
5.5 Summary of results
T h em a i nr e s u l t sf r o mt h ei m p u l s er e s p o n s ea n a l y s i sc a nb es u m m a r i s e da sf o l -
lows. The adjustment paths following a shock to the economy diﬀer in the agency
cost model and the model without agency costs. Following a temporary positive
productivity shock, for example, output rises more gradually in the agency cost
model compared to the model without agency costs. This is because of a delayed
response in investment due to net worth. In contrast, following a temporary shock
t of o r e i g nd e m a n do rt h ef o r e i g ni n t e r e s tr a t et h ee ﬀects on output are magniﬁed
in the agency cost model. Output increases (decreases) faster and remains above
(below) steady state for longer compared to the model without agency costs. As a
result, the interest rate increases (decreases) by more and stays higher for longer,
leading to larger swings in the nominal and real exchange rates.27
27The results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model. Sensitivity analyses are
available upon request.
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38The adjustment paths of the open economy model (with and without agency
costs) to a temporary productivity shock are similar to those in Carlstrom and
Fuerst’s (1997) closed economy model. But the dynamic responses to a monetary
policy shock are diﬀerent from Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (2000) closed economy.
This is because in this model imports are a production input. Following an un-
expected tightening in monetary policy output falls. But the decline in output is
quickly reversed and output increases when imports are a production input. This
is because the real appreciation of the domestic currency following the tightening
leads to a decline in the cost of imports and hence production. In a semi-closed
economy with a near-zero coeﬃcient on imports in ﬁrms’ production function,
this does not occur. Output falls following an unexpected tightening and stays
below steady state before gradually returning to equilibrium. The result high-
lights the importance of incorporating a foreign sector and exchange rate into
macroeconomic models.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper developed a theoretical model of a small open economy to assess the
eﬀects of endogenous agency costs and asymmetric information in credit mar-
kets. The basis of the analysis followed Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1997) closed
economy model. The Carlstrom and Fuerst model was extended to an open
economy with a ﬂoating exchange rate. Moreover, slowly adjusting goods prices,
ag o v e r n m e n ta n da ni n ﬂation targeting monetary authority were introduced.
Agency costs arose because of an ex post information asymmetry between bor-
rowers and lenders. Only borrowers could costlessly observe actual returns after
project completion. The imperfect information led to a moral hazard problem
and lowered the probability that a loan would be repaid. Financial intermediaries
helped overcome the information asymmetry by lending to entrepreneurs via a
debt contract and monitoring entrepreneurs who default on their debt.
The model was calibrated for New Zealand. The steady states with and
without agency costs were derived and the eﬀects of these costs on business cycle
ﬂuctuations were assessed. The analysis showed that a decline in the information
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders lowers agency costs and increases the
long-run level of steady state investment, capital and output. The presence of
agency costs also aﬀects the business cycle and the adjustment paths of interest
and exchange rates. Agency costs exacerbate movements in the exchange rate
following a shock from the foreign sector.
The diﬀerences in the adjustment paths of the model with and without agency
costs following a shock to the economy provide evidence of important eﬀects of
endogenous agency costs and information asymmetries in credit markets. This
suggests that macroeconomic models that do not explicitly account for asymmet-
ric information between borrowers and lenders provide an incomplete description
of the economy. It also underlines the importance of a well-functioning ﬁnan-
39cial system. Financial intermediaries and markets help overcome an information
asymmetry in credit market and improve the allocation of resources. If ﬁnancial
systems do not function well, the economy cannot operate eﬃciently and eco-
nomic activity will be negatively aﬀected. Finally, the results showed important
diﬀerences in the adjustment paths of the open economy compared to the closed
economy case. This ﬁnding underlines the importance of incorporating a foreign
sector and exchange rate into macroeconomic models.
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42A Expected shares of net capital output in the agency
cost model
This appendix derives the expected shares of net capital output received by the
borrower and lender, f ( ) and g( ). The random variable ω is distributed
lognormal, i.e. ln(ω) ∼ N
¡
˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢












This distribution is normalised, since letting υ ≡ ln(ω) gives dυ = dω

















































































Therefore, the mean and variance of ω are
µ = E (ω)=e x p
³























˜ µ +˜ σ2¢¢
− exp
¡
2˜ µ +˜ σ2¢
=e x p
¡







The mean and standard deviation of ω are assumed to be unity and σ,i . e .
exp
³

















˜ σ2 =l n( 1+σ2) (98)
Substituting (98) into (97) yields
˜ µ = −
ln(1+σ2)
2 (99)
The expected share of net capital output received by the ﬁrm, f ( ), can then
































ω|˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢
=e x p
³






ω|˜ µ +˜ σ2, ˜ σ2¢
=1− Φ
¡
 |˜ µ +˜ σ2, ˜ σ2¢
(101)
f0 ( ) is given by
f0 ( )=−φ
¡





 |˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢¤
+ φ
¡
 |˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢
  (102)
Using (3) the share of net capital output received by the lender, g( ),i sd e r i v e d
as
g( )=1− f ( ) − αΦ( )
=1− f ( ) − αΦ
¡
 |˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢
=1− f ( ) − αΦ
¡
 |˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢ (103)
and g0 ( ) is given by
g0 ( )=−f0 ( ) − αφ
¡
 |˜ µ, ˜ σ2¢
(104)
44B Proof of proposition ?? and solution of the matrix quadratic
equations
T h ep r o o ff o l l o w sU h l i g( 1 9 9 7 ) .
Proof. Use the recursive equilibrium law of motion (equations 82 and 83) to
replace xt+1 and yt in equation (79). This yields equation
(AP + CR+ B)xt+1 +( AQ + CS + D)zt =0 (105)
which holds for arbitrary xt+1 and zt.T h u s ,t h e c o e ﬃcient matrices on xt and
zt are zero. Plugging equations (82) and (83) into equation (80) twice and using
(81) yields
0=( ( FP + JR+ G)P + KR+ H)xt+1
+((FQ+ JS+ L)N +( FP + JR+ G)Q + KS + M)zt
(106)
Again, the coeﬃcient matrices on xt+1 and zt need to be zero. Taking the colum-
nwise vectorisation of the coeﬃcient matrix on zt in equations (105) and (106)
and collecting terms in vec(Q) and vec(S) yields the formula for Q and S.
To ﬁnd P and thus R, rewrite the coeﬃcient matrix on xt+1 in equation (105)
as
R = −C+ (AP + B)






is nonsingular and C0C =0 .U s i n g ( 1 0 7 ) t o
replace R in the coeﬃcient matrix on xt+1 in (106) yields (85). Note that the
stability of the equilibrium is determined by the stability of P,s i n c eN has stable
roots by assumption.
To solve the matrix quadratic equations (84) and (85) for P,w r i t et h e ma s

















l is the number of deterministic equations, n is the number of endogenous vari-
ables and m the number of endogenous state variables.
Equation (108) can be solved by turning it into a generalised eigenvalue and
eigenvector problem, where the generalised eigenvalue λ and eigenvector s of a
matrix Ξ with respect to matrix ∆ are deﬁn e dt ob eav e c t o ra n dav a l u es a t i s f y i n g
λ∆s = Ξs (109)
45A standard eigenvalue problem is obtained if ∆ is the identity matrix. More
generally, the generalised eigenvector problem can be reduced to a standard one
if ∆ is invertible by calculating standard eigenvalues and eigenvectors for ∆−1Ξ
instead.
Theorem 1 To solve the quadratic matrix equation
ΥP2 − ΓP − Θ =0 (110)
for the m×m matrix P,g i v e nt h em×m matrices Γ and Θ,d e ﬁne the 2m×2m














where Im is the identity matrix of size m,a n d0m,m is a m×m matrix with only
zero entries.
1. If s is a generalised eigenvector and λ the corresponding generalised eigen-







some x ∈ Rm.
2. If there are m generalised eigenvalues λ1,...,λm together with s1,...,sm of










for some xi ∈ Rm,a n di f
(x1,...,xm) is linearly independent, then
P = ΩΛΩ−1 (113)
is a solution to the matrix quadratic equation (108), where Ω =[ x1,...,xm]
and Λ = diag (λ1,...,λm). The solution P is stable if |λi| < 1 for all
i =1 ,...m. Conversely, any diagonalisable solution P to equation (108)
can be written this way.
Proof. Verify that, for the last m rows of equation (109), any eigenvector s






for some x ∈ Rm because of the special form of Ξ and ∆.F o rt h eﬁrst m rows,
show that
λ
2Υx − λΓx − Θx =0
It follows that
ΥΩΛ2 − ΓΩΛ2 − ΘΩ =0
46and hence
ΥP2 − ΓP − Θ =0
after multiplying with Ω−1.
Reversing the steps shows that any diagonalisable solution P to (108) can be
written this way.











+(1− ηl − ηk − ηim)ην
¯ Y ν (1 + ν¯ yt)=ηl
¡ ¯ Z¯ Lh¢ν ¡
1+νzt + ν¯ lt
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ν (1 + ν ¯ imt)+( 1− ηl − ηk − ηim)












































νzt +( 1− ν)¯ yt − (1 − ν)¯ lh
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1+( 1− ν)¯ yt − (1 − ν)¯ kt
¢
=0
rt − (1 − ν)¯ yt +( 1− ν)¯ kt =0
























(1 + (1 − ν)¯ yt − (1 − ν) ¯ imt)
¯ imt =¯ yt − 1
1−νqt
(117)














































































































































































































































1+l nξt + ch
t + it − πt
¢
=0
(1 − ν)yt − (1 − ν)lh
t − ch











t(i),w h e r eMCt denotes the aggregate
marginal cost, equation (119) can be written as
(1 − ν)yt − (1 − ν)lh
t − ch
t + νzt + 1
θ (yt − ¯ yt) − it + πt =0 (120)
Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt − ηINt (1 − αΦ( t)) = 0
Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt − ηINt + ηINtαΦ( t)=0
¯ K (1 + kt+1) − (1 − δ) ¯ K (1 + kt) − ¯ IN(1 + int)
+ ¯ INαΦ(¯  )
³
1+int +
φ(¯  )¯  
Φ(¯  ) $t
´
=0
¯ Kkt+1 − (1 − δ) ¯ Kkt − ¯ IN(1 − αΦ(¯  ))int
+ ¯ INαφ(¯  )¯  $t =0
(121)
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(1 + (1 − ν)yt − (1 − ν)kt − lnξt)=0
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1+( 1− τ) ¯ R
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− it+1 + Et [πt+1]=0
(123)
Yt − (1 − η)Ch
t − ηCe
t − Gt − EXt − ηINt =0







− ¯ Ce (1 + ce
t) − ¯ G(1 + gt)
− ¯ EX(1 + ext) − ¯ IN(1 + int)=0
(1−η) ¯ Ch
η ch
t + ¯ Cece
t + ¯ Ggt + ¯ EXext + ¯ INint − ¯ Yy t =0
(124)
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1−g( t)ˆ Ψt =0
INt − IRtNWt
f( t(i))ˆ Ψt =0
¯ IN(1 + int) −
¯ IR ¯ NW
f(¯  )¯ Ψ
³
1+irt + nwt −
f0(¯  )¯  
f(¯  ) $t − ψt
´
=0
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¢ ¯ Kert − ¯ NWnwt =0
(130)
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(140)
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